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rebmilc
Oct 29, 2003, 5:45 PM
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Our results to our investigation will not be posted today. We are waiting for the coroner to let us re-examine the gear. As soon as that is completed we'll post our report on our website. Thank you to all of you that were on scene and helped. Our condolences go out to Dave and Kelly's family and friends.
Thank you,
RMRU
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cjain
Oct 29, 2003, 8:49 PM
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In reply to: ... To those who helped and were a part of the rescue efforts, have you been a part of any Post Trauma debreifing? If not, I humbly and sincerely suggest you contact the EMT/Fire dept to find the local coordinator... Critical Incident Stress Management is not psychology, nor is it therapy or a self-help group - it's education designed to give you coping tools, and a safe place to share grief (if so desired). No matter how "strong" a person you are, we were just not built to experience such things. Even if you feel like you are ok, a CISD can only help - for instance do you know that flashbacks, sleeplessness, irritibility, loss of appetite and huge list of other things (some dramatic) are normal reactions to abnormal circumstances? ... Donald
Well said. Some of these symptoms may not even show up right away. There is a good discussion about this kind of thing in the book, Medicine for Mountaineering, Ch. 4. Worth reading, in my opinion.
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vivalargo
Oct 30, 2003, 12:06 AM
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In reply to: Our results to our investigation will not be posted today. We are waiting for the coroner to let us re-examine the gear. As soon as that is completed we'll post our report on our website. RMRU
I can't imagine that the victims (RIP, I pray) are still roped together and harnessed up, so any investigation of gear will perforce involve single nuts and cams, et al, unless the bodies were extracted from the harnesses and the entire climbing chain kept en tact (which is what you always want to do, but which rarely happens).
Unless an investigator knows how the gear figured into the anchoring matrix, or was protection attatched to the rope between the leader/follower and the belayer, one can easily confuse gear racked on either climber (which is likely banged up from the fall), with components in the anchor matrix and/or protection that possibly ripped during a leader fall -- if, in fact, the accident happed by means of a leader fall, or because the second fell off (rock fall??) and pulled off the belayer.
In my experience (with YOSAR) with this dreadful but essential work, the only way to credibly reconstruct what happened is for someone to have kept the entire chain en tact, or to have taken exact notes and photos of both ends of the rope as they were connected to the climbers. The anchor end will have a series of knots, with equipment attached, close to the climber's harness, indicating the exact configuration of the belay anchor. If possible you want to "build" a "dry" anchor with the gear just as it on the rope and thereby reconstruct the anchor in a generic way. You'll also want to check the rope running between the two climbers, hoping any pro didn't get dislodged during the fall.
Questions such as rock fall et al can only be learned from eye-witness accounts, and this is often conflicting owing to the stressors of the situation on all involved.
An investigation of the exact spot where the anchor blew is also desirable, but usually takes some snooping around for probable locations.
Lastly, once you understand how things failed in a general way, you start examining individual pieces of gear, such as cams and nuts, et al.
In other words, you have to start with the macro, and work down, not the other way around, which I trust is the way things are coming down. I tried various times to reconstruct things from the micro up to the macro (because the system was cut into pieces or totally deconstructed during the rescue), and each time was never certain of my findings. If you have everything en tact, and know what you're looking at, the thing pretty much describes itself.
In the final word, the only lasting value in doing this kind of investigation is in coming up with some general guidlines per what we can all do or look for to avoid this kind of dreadful accident in the first place. If we don't learn from this, we are all at an even bigger loss. For that reason, this investigation is an essential service to all of us who tie into the rope.
Sincerely,
JL
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maculated
Oct 30, 2003, 6:48 AM
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I never posted anything to this thread because I felt it would be useless, but I do want to say that I love what this thread has become: simulataneously a lot of instruction, a lot of support, and a lot of love. Thanks a lot, you guys.
Thank you to those of you who logged on to share your thoughts and feelings about your friends.
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vivalargo
Nov 3, 2003, 4:42 PM
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Friends,
This morning I had an interesting conversation with a member of the Riverside Mountain Rescue Unit. Rescue team members are revisiting the equipment at the coroners office today, and hope to post a report of their findings by Wednesday. It is unresponsible for me to speculate or preempt the rescue officials per what they feel caused the accident, but from what I learned from the team member, this new information will shed entirely new light on the situation. Sadly, this new light will not in any way change what happened, but it's important and instructional to find out what actually did happen in a definitive way.
JL
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socalclimber
Nov 3, 2003, 5:33 PM
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I concur with John. I too have spoken with a person over the weekend who was doing the investigation, and when I heard his findings my jaw dropped. I will be curious to see what the final report says.
John is right on the money.
Robert
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mmarc
Nov 4, 2003, 2:32 AM
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Thanks again for all the support this board has shown.
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rebmilc
Nov 4, 2003, 6:16 PM
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We will be posting our information on our website by the end of this week.
RMRU
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howdyjeff
Nov 6, 2003, 6:19 PM
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Yes, I would like to suggest that RMRU come out with their report soon, and on the other hand that everyone remain patient. We don't want to rush or pressure them and risk losing important details or thoughtful evaluation.
It now sounds like they will, although announcing an actual deadline date is often helpful in keeping writers honest with themselves and in quieting the rabble. This is the sort of thing I bet could be worked on forever and still not satisfy. Rumors, too, are starting to fly, although they are not as “jaw dropping” as some have led us to believe, I think.
More importantly, I would also like to suggest that this might be delaying the process of moving forward for some of the people closely involved. Much of the expression and feeling necessary here has not, and will not, go on over the sort of public forum that this thread has provided, but rather in private, face to face among friends, and that’s going to become my focus now.
At the same time, I don’t think we should expect the report to necessarily resolve much for us. I don’t expect that the investigators will have found the definitive answer to what happened, as that is quite likely to be impossible in this case. The best thing perhaps would be a little more detail about the length of rope that was out, the sizes, sequence, and condition of gear on the rope, anything that may have been found up on the rock itself, etc. If that level of detail is not available, that’s OK too.
We must also understand that there have probably been a lot of other things going on for the people involved in producing the report, given the recent fires in southern California. At the risk of being dramatic, but for the benefit of those reading this who do not live here, many of us woke up the other morning to what would prove to be a number of days in a row of dusky brown skies smelling of smoke; a dim, red apocalyptic sun; a rain of ash covering a city in which all normal activity came to a standstill; and reports and images on the news, always frustratingly vague as to location, about fires that were raging uncontrolled through the surrounding countryside and through parts of the city. Some had homes directly threatened or destroyed. If it has been a very surreal experience for everyone here over the past couple weeks due to the fires, it has been all the more surreal for those also close to the accident, and it has further delayed feeling and expressing what we need to about this.
I have no reason to doubt that RMRU will stick closely to the facts and make reasonable inferences from them. Realize however, that sensitivity is not the primary goal of such a report, and we would not want to sacrifice any important details for it. In investigations like this one I think, there is usually very little obvious or directly related evidence to begin with. Those of us who knew and climbed with Dave and Kelly have few facts to go on. Investigators with only a handful of facts did not know the climbers, their abilities, or their practices. And no one was there with them high up on the rock, when it happened.
I haven’t had a chance to mention it, but it was good to see the reports from Art, Meg, and Adam a little while ago. That was very brave of them, and it was necessary for everyone. But in reflecting on my own response to reading them, I’ve got to admit that I think the substance of those and any other report is going to have limited emotional value now for those of us closely involved in getting through this.
We must be prepared for the likelihood that any sort of report will probably not help us to resolve our feelings. I’m beginning to understand now that more about what specifically might have happened will most certainly only do the opposite: set us back temporarily. Reports will give us a few more facts and speculations to feed our already obsessive imagination about what has happened. And I suppose it may be time for me to curb my habit of checking back here every morning for "answers."
I can really only speak for myself, but I expect that it is now becoming apparent for many of us involved that we were in shock about the accident during the first week. That we were also in shock about the fires during the second week has not helped. A sort of disbelief has allowed me to continue with my life in what feels like a normal, if numb, way for a little while. That has also been my experience in dealing with a couple other, non-climbing-related, traumatic times in my life, but in getting past them I guess I’d forgotten that things are going to be more complicated, and that we don’t get off as easily as just being numb about it.
People who are not directly involved in this may not understand some of what I’m saying here, but that’s just because understanding in this case is not a matter of intellect--you’ve got to be living and feeling it. Dealing with something like this involves riding out a river of emotions that you can’t abstract, objectify, or control.
Some have been expressing their feelings about it more, or better, than others of us, but each in a way that is unique and probably necessary for that person. For the first week I had been going through the motions. I buried myself in the details. You may call it avoidance, but over the years I’ve in some ways changed and become better at confronting difficult things in my life, and in other ways I’ve come to accept that’s just how I operate. Because it is apparently an important part of what makes us human, some of us struggled to make sense of this and find meaning in it, even perhaps where there may be none in the end. We have had memorials and funerals to honor and remember Dave and Kelly and the good things in their lives and to give each other mutual support. The memorials are also supposed to be an aid for us to find catharsis and closure. But for some of us, it looks far too soon for that, and these things will be measured in months or years, not days.
At the end of the first week, I attended the memorial at Humber Park. It was a wonderful gathering of people, and it was good to meet some old friends I hadn’t seen in awhile as well as some new folks and relatives of Dave and Kelly I’d never met. It made me realize that although I had climbed off and on with Dave for many years, there was in fact much about him I didn't know, that he had really only recently begun to open up to me as a confidant about his life outside of climbing, that he had his foibles as we all do, and also that he had more friends and had touched more people than I had expected. All of these folks have been tremendously supportive and understanding, and I have tried to do my best too, but I feel I have come up short not only in offering friendship, but even in just being friendly sometimes about things right now. Depending on my mood, I have made some appearances, and I have also avoided making others. I attended Kelly’s memorial and Dave’s funeral, but I did not stay long afterward.
Now, before anyone writes back in response to this letter to send their support or to suggest one therapy or the other, I would instead simply ask for understanding for those of us who may be acting a little strange right now. That’s my theme: dealing with getting through this myself, helping friends when I can, and extending understanding to others.
This did not end with Dave and Kelly. That was only the beginning for the rest of us. As climbing has become a lifestyle for me, I’m discovering that this incident--the climbing death of a friend--is in a deep and very real way threatening the continuation of my lifestyle as I have come to understand it. I’m beginning to discover that it is not simply a matter of choosing to get back out and climb for me. I face losing something that has seemed to me one of the few things in my life at which I had a true natural talent and confidence, an unreserved zest for sharing with others, and an uncomplicated enjoyment. Other friends and climbers I know, too, are also just beginning to feel that this will have more profound effects on their lives than was initially apparent.
A partner and I left Humber Park early on the day of the memorial a couple weeks ago to hike up and do what will be our last climb of the season at Tahquitz this year and perhaps for some time. Part of our purpose was to carry out our own more personal memorial in placing prayer flags on the summit. Another part of my own unspoken purpose was to discover whether it might be necessary for me to carry out a sort of memorial for my own climbing, and lifestyle, as I have known it for the past several years. Nothing was resolved for me on that climb.
I have gone from as powerful a desire this summer to climb the big peaks of the Sierra, and to perhaps make guiding something I could do, at least in part, for a meager but satisfying living, to as powerful a reality now as having lost much of my joy in climbing for the time being. And there’s something that we as climbers do in performing that little trick in our minds about risk and fear in order to climb boldly and even safely, that simply does not hold up under circumstances like these.
It will be difficult for me to look at climbing in the same way as before, knowing firsthand that there is the possibility that I could put people who care about me through what some of us, friends and family, are experiencing now. And it will be difficult, feeling very clearly the conflict between a love of climbing, and the fact that, because of climbing, we have all lost such an important friend to us.
Jeff
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roseraie
Nov 8, 2003, 7:26 AM
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The RMRU report has been released.
http://www.rmru.org/2003-026.htm
I would like to apologize for our incorrect speculation on what happened. What the RMRU concluded never even occurred to us, and I am sorry if, through our guesses as to what happened, we provided inaccurate information.
Meg
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howdyjeff
Nov 8, 2003, 7:18 PM
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No need to apologize, Meg. Everyone has provided important pieces of the puzzle. Thanks, too, to RMRU for releasing their report. There’s nothing I’d like to say more than that we’ve got a good theory of what happened now. We are getting closer, but I don’t think we’ve quite got it yet. I think a couple things still need to be clarified, and we can get closer.
Some of the details and suppositions by the RMRU are a little unclear and as such don’t appear to make sense from a climbing standpoint. Nothing they suggest is impossible, though. I would urge everyone to withhold chiming in on this until after I talk with an investigator to clear up some details. I would also suggest everyone not flood the RMRU with questions. If I and maybe a couple others such as John, who sounds like he’s already been in contact with them, ask a few more questions, we can post answers here and make some clarifications for both the climbers and non-climbers interested, so just hang tight.
Before the report had been released, I had planned on not digging into it too deeply, and not posting much more here. Again, I think that those of us closely involved need to start concentrating on moving forward now, rather than digging further into details that will just continue to remind us of our pain. But I feel some responsibility to Dave and Kelly, and to other climbers, to try to clear up a couple things. More later.
Jeff
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papounet
Nov 9, 2003, 10:52 AM
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In reply to: .. hat’s my theme: dealing with getting through this myself, helping friends when I can, and extending understanding to others. This did not end with Dave and Kelly. That was only the beginning for the rest of us. As climbing has become a lifestyle for me, I’m discovering that this incident--the climbing death of a friend--is in a deep and very real way threatening the continuation of my lifestyle as I have come to understand it. I’m beginning to discover that it is not simply a matter of choosing to get back out and climb for me. I face losing something that has seemed to me one of the few things in my life at which I had a true natural talent and confidence, an unreserved zest for sharing with others, and an uncomplicated enjoyment. Other friends and climbers I know, too, are also just beginning to feel that this will have more profound effects on their lives than was initially apparent. .. Nothing was resolved for me on that climb. .. It will be difficult for me to look at climbing in the same way as before, knowing firsthand that there is the possibility that I could put people who care about me through what some of us, friends and family, are experiencing now. And it will be difficult, feeling very clearly the conflict between a love of climbing, and the fact that, because of climbing, we have all lost such an important friend to us. Jeff
Dear Jeff,
Thanks for sharing your thoughts and your sorrows.
You are not alone.
I quoted some parts of your message which resonated well with how I felt after Jean-Phi died in a moutain-skiing accident, last spring. I have stepped down on the climbing for a while, I dedicated a writing to him, and I took the time to focus on living a life slightly more orientated toward family and friends and strangers.
Surviving an acident or loosing a close one puts one into the difficult position to revisit some of the assumptions he/she has been operating under. Overcoming the death of Dan and Kelly will, after a while, help you steer toward a worthwhile life (which may or may not include climbing).
nicolas
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hikerken
Nov 9, 2003, 5:58 PM
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As is usual, there are lessons to be learned from any accident.
Quite striking, is the concept that tying in to a rope provides no protection, if it is not anchored. In fact, it is undoubtedly an impediment, as you have to pay attention the rope, instead of your feet, and you probably have one hand managing the rope. A couple of years ago, another fellow and I were leading an "introduction to mountaineering" trip, in which we were going to have people get some experience trekking in crampons, carring an axe, roped up. Only problem.....no snow! So, to simulate some of the experience, we roped up, and hiked a trail in teams of three. Quite an experience for many, with fall, trips, etc. Managing a rope is a significant task, and a significant distraction.
Also, although it was not part of this accident, was the point of view of SLCD's as exclusive anchoring devices at a belay.
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howdyjeff
Nov 10, 2003, 2:17 AM
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hikerken,
You make some good points about safety. But it is now my belief, contrary to the conclusion reached in the RMRU report, that this may have been a case of a follower's fall pulling the belay.
I think that some facts that we already know, as well as some others that I have spoken about with those on the scene suggest the possibility that this wasn't an unbelayed fall. An unbelayed fall in this case is not an impossible conclusion, but I don't think it is the most likely, given some of the facts.
I am currently waiting for clarification about a couple final things before I post my arguments.
Jeff
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vivalargo
Nov 10, 2003, 2:29 AM
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Hello, Friends.
Per all the backchannel requests I've gotten to chim in on the RMRU accident report, like Jeff, I still need to get totally clear on a few key details. For now, my thinking is in line with Jeff's last post.
Also, once an open discussion starts per the technical menutia, I suggest starting another thread. This thread has served the duo purpose of getting the facts straight, and giving those close to the victims a chance to start procesing the tradegy. I don't have to heart to launch into a very impersonal technical discussion (as it has to be) on a thread that has so much deeply personal material.
JL
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philbox
Moderator
Nov 10, 2003, 2:46 AM
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Excellent idea JL. May I suggest that starting a new thread would be in order sooner rather than later. I agree that discussing the mechanical minutae is not consistant with where the bereaved are up to in their processing of their grief. It is nice to keep all of the information in one place but there is too much emotion involved (as it should well be) for a discussion on the failure mode to be useful in understanding how best to avoid repeating the same thing in the future.
The more we learn the more we need to know to come to an understanding.
I am mindfull to keep a certain reverance for the deceased as well. We must not forget that people have lost their lives and that other people are still coming to terms in their own way with the aftermath.
I do thank those who were close to them for their understanding and allowing us to discuss this tragedy amongst the climbing community.
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adamzappal
Nov 10, 2003, 6:07 AM
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In my puny opinion, I think its fine to just keep the entire discussion in this same thread. Just thought i should say.
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maculated
Nov 10, 2003, 6:19 AM
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Why don't those of you who want to discuss this (and I would like to see it) split off a thread? No reason not to.
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sharpender
Nov 10, 2003, 7:01 AM
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"Let us stop here a little while longer! It is good to rest on the summit, and to dream amongst the clouds for a few short moments in one's life." Guido Rey, Peaks and Precipices.
For certain, from what we have shared here in this thread, we can know that Dave and Kelly lived this in their lives. And in the cutting short of their lives we see again for the living how short and precious life is. In our sadness at losing them we must to honor them dream amongst the clouds of our lives and know that they are resting on the summit where we dream. My thoughts and prayers are with Dave and Kelly's family and all the caring people who came to help in their terrible hour of need. God be with you.
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howdyjeff
Nov 10, 2003, 12:23 PM
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OK folks, prepare for another long one.
I mentioned earlier that rumors and preliminaries I had heard floating around about what the RMRU report might say beforehand did not seem surprising. I had apparently not heard the right rumors, and in any case I wasn’t going to comment on anything until after the official report was released. But the report does seem a little surprising to me now, since it suggests that the climbers had finished the climb, taken down the belay, then someone stumbled and fell, pulling both climbers off the rock. This is not impossible, but I don’t feel that it’s the most likely explanation, either.
I had heard earlier about evidence that the fall might have occurred higher, on the final pitch, contrary to my initial supposition of pitch 3. This didn’t surprise me much, but in absence of any evidence found on the rock itself, and without access to the sizes of gear on each climber’s harness, which might suggest one pitch over another, I simply began by considering what I felt to be the most likely place on the route for a fall. Pitch 3 definitely stands out in my mind as a good candidate, and if I have succeeded in making climbers wary of this pitch, then good.
There have of course always been other possibilities, though. In any case, the skid marks and impact point found by the RMRU suggest that the climbers fell higher up, on the final pitch, and there’s no reason to doubt it in light of this new evidence. These marks are perhaps the most important bit of evidence in helping determine more closely where the fall occurred, and maybe even what precipitated it, and I have requested that an investigator point out for me on a photo of the route where these marks were found. Also very important in determining what might have happened, but not reported by RMRU or anyone else, would be the length of rope out between the two climbers. I spoke with Adam about this, and he estimated about 25-30 feet, given the position of the two after the fall.
I would like to again thank the RMRU for all their efforts, for releasing the report, for introducing important new evidence, and for answering my questions. An RMRU investigator I spoke with over the weekend cleared up some of the more minor inconsistencies in the report, which I will talk about here, but I’m still waiting for more detailed information about the location of the skid marks. In the meantime, I’ll also put forward some questions and, yes, more speculation. I don’t want to reprint the entire RMRU post, but I will quote a number of points. I have also included a couple photos and drawings at the very end of this post that I have been using to communicate and clarify with others, that might help you better understand what I’m talking about.
First, I’ll mention a few very important established facts. We have established that Dave was belaying, given that rope was running through his belay device and that he had attached to his harness an equalized cordalette with anchor gear on it. There is another important fact that we have not yet considered, but that has been there all along. It wasn’t mentioned in any of the reports, and it only occurred to me later during a conversation with Florabel. That there was also gear racked on Dave’s harness after the fall should have told us from the start that he had just finished leading a pitch and was belaying from above. If he were belaying from below he would have given all his gear, except what was on the belay, to Kelly to lead the pitch. This means that Kelly could not have been leading, and that it could not have been a factor two fall, where the leader falls a long way from above, exerting a great deal of downward force on the anchor. If this was a belayed fall, it was a follower’s fall, which is a little more surprising because the forces involved are typically not as great. Slack is taken up by the belayer from above, so when the follower falls the rope catches him almost immediately.
RMRU: “Coiling the rope we discovered that there wasn't any gear on the rope. The only gear that was on or near the ledge was two Camelots, a carabiner, and a prussik attached to a cordalette.”
First of all, the prussik mentioned isn’t really a prussik but a knot sort of like a sliding double grapevine that allowed Dave to shorten and lengthen one of the cords he always used to clip in at the belay. This is a minor point, but it would eliminate any thought that the accident might have been caused during emergency ascending, self-rescue, etc., suggested by a prussik. Also, it hints at what extent Dave would not have been walking around with loose cords, gear, and rope dangling. I have never seen anyone else use this type of knot, and I’ve never come across it in any book, but it’s purpose was always clear to me: as soon as Dave was done with this cord at the belay, he would slide the knot to shorten the cord and clip it back to his harness to keep it out of the way. Dave, like many other experienced climbers, had developed this and other habits, which once they become an automatic part of the process are the mainstay of safe climbing.
RMRU: “We found one Camalot on the ledge without a carabiner on it and wonder if it was being carried and was being reracked as they were walking to the top?”
Correct me if I’m wrong, but I think that the camalot found on the ledge is the one that Adam mentions in an earlier report having removed from an anchor cordalette and set aside when he was with Dave. The investigator I spoke with confirmed that RMRU thinks there were three cams on the belay anchor, and in addition to the two mentioned in the first quote this would be the third, it seems, rather than one being carried and reracked while the climbers were walking to the top. Besides, it would be quite remarkable as well if Dave had carried a loose cam in his hand all the way down, or if it had fallen with him and ended up next to him.
It is possible, though somewhat unlikely, that there was more gear involved than just these three belay anchors, but that it somehow came off the rope in the fall. No more gear was found though, and I am going to assume that this was all the gear involved.
RMRU: “We believe that the climbers finished the ‘Step’ and traverse over to the top of the ‘White Maiden’. Since the last section is easy we think they may have been walking up to the top when one slipped and fell taking the other one with him.”
I’m not exactly sure what this means, because the belay at the top for both White Maiden and The Step is at the same spot. Finishing The Step would not necessitate traversing to White Maiden. Basically, the climb finishes on a long, approximately 30-foot, slab that is steep at the bottom for a couple moves then becomes gradually gentler toward the belay. There is no place for the sort of gear belay reported anywhere in the middle of this slab, only at the belay on top that I mention above, so there would be no reason for the climbers to be walking around on this slab without a belay.
Nor would the climbers, once finished and off belay, have any reason to walk above these routes near the slab for the descent. Once off belay, climbers walk straight back from the slab on flat ground between and behind a summit block and a boulder to reach the trail that leads to the descent.
Dave had climbed Super Pooper with me in the past, which has the same finish and the same belay as The Step. I’m confident that his belay this time would have been in the same spot as then. There are few other, and no better, options for a gear belay in this vicinity. The cam sizes reported are consistent with the crack at this belay, which is a horizontal crack down low, formed where a massive summit block joins the slab. You can get good gear here, but it is also shallow and flaring in spots, also making for the possibility of some less-than-ideal cam placements. There aren’t really any good nut or hex placements. Lately, I’ve personally taken to throwing a loop of rope around the large boulder just to the west of this spot, fixing it with a locking carabiner, as that is faster and more obviously bomber than fiddling cams into the crack.
RMRU: “we did find the first impact sight which was about 60 feet from the top. A team member then lined himself up with the fall line down to the first impact site. There we found what looked like skid marks in the lichen and they lined up perfectly with the first impact site.”
Learning the exact location of the impact sight and skid marks is very important to any further speculation. As I said before, I’ve asked an investigator to locate them for me on a photo and drawing of the routes mentioned. I am still waiting for that information, although I am considering hiking up myself and trying to locate them. If their location lines up to be below the belay I describe, or even not too far to the east, as the finish of the route arches from east to west up to the belay, then my speculation below may be valid.
Here is what would have happened when the two reached the top. Dave would have gotten to the top and set up his belay at the spot I have indicated. Since the anchor placements are down low, climbers usually sit down here to rest while belaying, bracing their feet out in front of them in some shallow depressions on the slab. Then Dave would have belayed Kelly up to the low-angled slab at his position and possibly even had Kelly go up around and behind him a couple steps between the belay and the boulder to where it is completely flat. In either case, this would have left only a few feet of rope between them, rather than the 25-30 feet that were between the climbers after the fall as estimated by Adam.
Once Kelly was up, Dave would have taken him off belay (i.e. taken the rope out of the belay device) so Kelly could move around freely without tugging on him. This would be to give Kelly enough slack to sit down and rest, take his climbing shoes off, have a drink, etc., which is what you are very anxious to do after a long climb like this. Then Dave would turn around to take down the belay anchor. Rather than having cords and gear dangling to trip on, he probably would have racked the belay gear on his harness and gathered up the cords. After this, Dave would walk a couple steps on low-angled terrain to get around the corner, off the slab, and between and behind the block and boulder to where Kelly might be. Both would then untie from the rope, pack up, and walk straight back from the edge on flat ground to follow the trail to the friction descent on the opposite side of the rock.
Climbers know that Dave would almost certainly have taken Kelly off belay before breaking down the belay anchor gear. But the rope was found still in Dave’s device after the fall. And the belay cords and gear had not been gathered up or reracked.
This suggests to me that Dave was anchored, and belaying Kelly up, when the fall occurred. Kelly slipped and fell somewhere on the final pitch, pulling a belay made exclusively of three cams, two small and one medium, that happened to be less-than-perfect placements. It is also possible that rock broke at the belay, but the RMRU reported no obviously broken rock in the vicinity.
So, if this were a case of a follower fall on the final pitch, where would that fall most likely have occurred? I’ve mentioned before that such a fall typically does not generate what we would normally consider to be enough force to pull a belay anchor. It’s basically the weight of the follower under a brief acceleration until the rope catches, softened a little by the dynamic properties of rope stretch. Add to this that most of the final pitch is low-angled slab, and a very high-force fall becomes even more unlikely. But there is one section on the pitch where a fall could generate significantly more force. This section just so happens to be about 30 feet below the belay, I think, which would also correspond to the amount of rope that Adam estimated was out between the two climbers.
The section I’m talking about is a sort of vertical “headwall” that separates an upper from a lower slab on the final pitch. Starting from where The Step and Super Pooper converge, the climb traverses up and right on a horizontal crack under this headwall, where the wall meets the lower slab. In the middle of the wall, the climb ascends a vertical crack on the right, then plates on the left, to gain a ledge above the wall.
This vertical crack is the last place on the pitch that offers gear placements. That means that once past this point, Kelly would have cleaned all the remaining gear from the pitch, which is consistent with there not having been any remaining gear on the rope, and which would have meant that the belay would have been all that was then left to hold a fall.
Beyond the ledge above the headwall is the final slab to the belay. This slab begins with two very steep friction moves that are just enough steeper than any of the moves on the slab above Lunch Ledge to always give me pause when I am preparing to lead past them. These friction moves and the crack below are the hardest sections on this final pitch. If Kelly had slipped and fallen on the friction moves or the vertical crack, this would have been the only section high on the pitch where he would have free-fallen down a vertical wall, rather than tumbled down a slab, thus generating significantly more force on the belay--perhaps enough to pull it if the cam placements weren’t absolutely solid.
I mentioned in an earlier post that cams are normally very solid and that in general gear works like it is supposed to when well placed. But what John has said about the tendency for cams to rotate out even in good placements or to not always be quite so solid in flaring placements, etc., is very true. Speaking with the investigator, it was my impression that the RMRU leaned toward an unbelayed fall because, among other things, they felt that the cams were large enough to be unlikely to pull out in a fall. Personally, I have always considered the two #0.5 camalots (one-inch) to be on the small side, and the #1 (one-and-half-inch) to be a medium. I don’t feel that it would be impossible for these pieces to pull, if conditions were right.
Examining the gear itself also seems to hint at the possibility, though not conclusive, of a belay pulling. One of the #0.5’s is badly twisted, the other has a cam that is frozen, and the #1 is also slightly twisted. These could have been damaged in the fall, but most of the other gear on both harnesses does not show significant damage. Also interesting was that I found numerous spots on the belay cord that showed signs of melted nylon, as might occur when sudden, significant force is applied to the cord by carabiners. Again, not conclusive, but suggestive.
I visited Florabel yesterday, and she graciously let me examine and photograph the gear involved in the accident. I can’t speak about all the friends and family involved here, but if you know Florabel, although she is continuing to deal with the loss on an emotional level, she has also been very interested in the technical details and the speculation all along, and not at all timid or offended. Just as she was interested in joining us on trips to Joshua Tree to watch Dave’s climbing and critique that of his partners, she was also very interested to examine the gear with me and discuss the technical details. I also spoke early on with many non-climbing friends of Dave and Kelly who asked me to give them an explanation in lay terms of the technical details involved along the way so that they could better understand.
Reflecting on this, I think that it would not be out of place to continue such a technical and detailed discussion on this thread, unless there are other compelling reasons to do so. It also might only confuse things to move our discussion to another place, when enough people are looking right here to generate a remarkable tens-of-thousands of views per day, and three million views so far since the beginning of this thread. For those of you who haven’t noticed, these numbers are indicated to the left, under the menu. Yet more evidence of the level of support and interest that this incident has generated.
Jeff
http://www.adventuresportguides.com/dk/taq4b.jpg
http://www.adventuresportguides.com/dk/topo2.jpg
http://www.adventuresportguides.com/dk/drawing.jpg
http://www.adventuresportguides.com/dk/gear.jpg
http://www.adventuresportguides.com/dk/taq2s.jpg
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roseraie
Nov 10, 2003, 5:31 PM
Post #171 of 221
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Jeff,
The only question I have left (other than the one you are waiting on from the RMRU) is, was the gear on Kelly (the follower) consistent with what you know of the placements earlier on the pitch, especially since you know how Dave might lead that pitch?
Thank you for your well-thought out and backed-up speculation, I know a lot of people will appreciate it.
Meg
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vivalargo
Nov 10, 2003, 8:00 PM
Post #172 of 221
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Registered: Nov 26, 2002
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Great job from Jeff. I agree with virtually all of his ideas.
But the question remains: how can a top rope fall generate enough force to rip out a three point, equalized anchor. Granted, the SLCD's might have been damaged during the fall, but it is more likely they were violently ripped out owing to frozen cams and torqued metal.
Here's how I see it.
Dave is belaying on top, where Jeff suggests. Following, Kelly surmounts the brief, steep headwall, and drawing near the top of a long and difficult climb, he starts to motor over the last slab bit some 30 feet below Dave. Psyched to be so close to the top, Kelly has, or begins, climbing ever so slightly faster than Dave can take in rope -- as commonly happens with all of us -- and as Kelly paddles up the tricky slab moves above the headwall, a small loop of slack, perhaps only a few feet, collects in the rope. Kelly slips, and with the small loop of slack and the rope stretch, he falls perhaps 8-10 feet, onto the steeper headwall section below, before he shock loads onto the rope. There is likely a bit of slack between Dave and his anchor, and when Kelly's weight hits the rope, the impact is litte different than if Dave was holding a leader fall of 8-10 feet. Dave is wrenched down, the anchor is shock-loaded, and it fails. Add to this the possibility for a slightly oblique angle of impact force --Kelly might have been a bit down and left of Dave's anchor point -- and this all makes sense.
These days, I think when most people think of "top rope" fall, they think of catching someone seconding a sport climb or catching a fall on a top rope route in the gym. In both of these instances, the top anchor or shutts take the blunt of the impact force. With trad climbing, if there is slack in the line, and little rope separating the belayer from the person following (25-30 of rope separated Jeff from Kelly), an eight to ten foot fall generates more impact force than you would think.
I hope this focuses the discussion.
JL
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howdyjeff
Nov 10, 2003, 11:45 PM
Post #173 of 221
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Meg, the gear photos I posted above included gear that was on Dave (the overall photo including the harness), and gear that was on Kelly (the overall photo with loose gear only). I think that some of the loose slings in the latter photo may have actually been with Dave. Florabel mentioned also that there were perhaps three or four more cams in the stuff that Kelly had, but that she had left these for Kelly's family to take, unsure whether they belonged to Dave or Kelly. These pieces are not included in the photos.
I think that the gear with Kelly is consistent with the final pitch. While there are a couple spots on the final pitch for very small cams and nuts such as those shown with Kelly, there’s nothing like that on pitch 3, for instance, which has perhaps a couple one-inch and, mostly, much wider gear placements.
Again, John makes some excellent points, and I got some mail this morning from others who raised the same issues. Slack could have formed in the rope as Kelly came up the slab, causing greater shock in a fall. I think it is also possible that if Kelly fell down the headwall, he would have swung far to the right under the belay, wrenching the anchors. That may have placed more initial strain on one of the cams, perhaps the twisted one, could have rotated them, and wrenched them loose. Another point here: Dave would not have been able to see Kelly if he was anywhere below the low-angled slab to the top. Even the two very sketchy moves at the bottom of this slab are just below where you can see a follower, and a fall there may have completely taken Dave off guard.
On a related note, I was wondering earlier about the anchor configuration. Adam talks about an equalized gold cord and also the grey cord attached to his harness that Dave used like a daisy chain. First, I was wondering whether the gold cord equalized all three cams, then the grey cord was attached to the gold one? Or did the gold cord, clipped directly to Dave’s harness equalize two cams, with the grey one anchored directly to a single cam? Also, was the gold cord equalized in a sliding configuration, as you would equalize a looped runner by bringing it down into a “V” and twisting the middle, or was it tied off in the middle like a cordalette? I have never personally used a cordalette by tying it off after equalizing, because once tied off, the cord is no longer self-equalizing. If force is applied obliquely to such an anchor, or if the belayer is standing to one side of it, it is likely that all the initial force will come to bear on a single piece of gear, thus completely nullifying the purpose of equalization.
Finally, I’d also like to emphasize once again that an unbelayed fall, as the RMRU suggests, is not an impossible scenario here. It is entirely possible that Kelly had come up to beside or below where Dave was belaying. There could have been a significant amount of slack if Kelly came up the slab faster than Dave could belay. Anxious to get up on the flat area behind the boulders, Dave could have left the rope in the belay device, quickly pulled the anchor gear and taken it all with him, planning to sort things out a few steps higher, on the flat. At this point, one of the climbers could have stumbled backward. My only problem with this is that the slab is fairly low-angled at the very top for the most part, and a stumbling climber is likely to just fall down on the slab, perhaps tumble briefly, but come to a stop. It’s not impossible though, I suppose, that a stumble here could turn into something more serious.
Another question that remains is that of the rockfall heard. But my guess is that this could have been loose rock knocked off the slab below, as the climbers fell, the rope between them sweeping the face.
Jeff
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adamzappal
Nov 11, 2003, 12:26 AM
Post #174 of 221
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Registered: Oct 22, 2003
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RMRU told me not to post the pics and I wasn’t planning to when I took the pictures in the first place. I’m not sure if they didn’t want me posting it until after the report or if they did not want it posted period. But now I when I think about, I felt the public has the right to know.
The thing is, I really don't consider these types of anchors to be truly equalized for a number of reasons. You see people use this configuration all the time; mountaineering books and other illustrations show this as one of the methods to create an anchor.
http://www.surveillancenetworks.com/...-Kelly_Tufo-gear.jpg
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vivalargo
Nov 11, 2003, 12:48 AM
Post #175 of 221
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[quote="howdyjeff"] I think it is also possible that if Kelly fell down the headwall, he would have swung far to the right under the belay, wrenching the anchors. That may have placed more initial strain on one of the cams, perhaps the twisted one, could have rotated them, and wrenched them loose."
This is what I was suggesting when I said an oblique angle of force was put on the anchor, seeming that Kelly was down and left of Jeff, and given some little slack in the rope, plus a sideways tumbling fall, you have forces sufficient to strain even the best anchors.
While it is not impossible for someone to "fall" or stumble on the rock behind the summit block, I find it almost impossible to believe such a "fall' would carry the person over the edge. You'd just fall over and get back up.
JL
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